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Pragmatism and Existential 
Philosophy  
Hans Lipps 
Translation by Jason Hills1 
I 
 Existential philosophy determines the current situation of philosophy 
in Germany; it consummates the most complete separation with prior 
philosophy.  Despite the diversity of its systems and points of view of 
previous philosophies, we recognize today the homogeneity of its aims and 
the persistence of its problems.  It was guided by a tendency taken a priori as 
natural that no longer suffices for the tendencies and aspirations that, in the 
thought of our time, urgently desire to surface.  The fact that it is made up 
entirely of doctrines and systems appears to render it problematic.  Perhaps 
no previous era “knew” those systems as well as ours, but the very fact that 
this philosophy can be transformed into pure and simple knowledge renders 
it suspect.  We have learned not to trust what can be shown within the limits 
of reason, what can be contained within it, and what can be placed at the 
disposal of everyone and under the general shape of philosophy,2 without 
requiring any exertion or existential risk [risque d’existence].3  We recognize 
today the non-obligatory character of these systems and doctrines. 
 The influence of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard is symptomatic of the 
current situation.4  Both were taken as outsiders in their days, because their 
thought differed so much from others.  Here there are more doctrines and 
positions than one could ever prove or whose raison d’être could be 
discussed.  It is an entirely new general attitude.  It is not a thought content 
with solutions for freeing itself, as it were, from itself.  Both Nietzsche and 
Kierkegaard attacked the “systems” in which everything seemed to them to 
be oversimplified and reduced to the trivial.  They show how those systems 
move us away from the gravity of the problem that surfaced in the self, the 
reality of existence.  The uncertain, tense, indefinite, fragmentary character 
of our temporal existence stands in contradiction with the totalizing nature 
that informs those doctrines.  Both discovered how “inhuman” it is to begin 
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from a “pure” subject of knowledge.  For Nietzsche the will to create a 
system reveals a lack of honesty. 
Here the question of knowing what philosophy “is” is posed anew.  It 
frees itself from its union with science that goes back to Descartes.  
Knowledge, for Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, is “interpretation.” It is an 
understanding that enlightens, a discovery that reveals those very depths of 
our existence which are originally hidden.  Existential philosophy is not a 
doctrine; it can only be learned through experience.  For, this new 
movement of thought opens the space through which reflection must travel, 
all the while knowing that it will not have a basis.  We would only like to 
determine the direction of the path of this thought. 
 Kierkegaard said, “The philosopher of the system, as a man, resembles 
someone who builds a castle, yet who lives in the shed beside it.  This 
fantastic being does not live in what he thinks, yet the thought of a man 
must be the house in which he lives.”  One can easily notice a certain affinity 
between the motifs of such a thought and those of pragmatism.  When 
pragmatism, without allowing itself to be influenced by any point of view, 
undertakes an analysis of the practice of knowledge, what does it find there, 
if not the insignificance and the platitudes of such disputes as those of 
scholastic philosophy?  Pragmatism, also, combats a philosophy that, in 
ignorance of its originary character, wanted to establish itself as science, but 
as a supreme science, as a science that has never been up to date and that 
has always remained behind; whereas positive science, within the limits in 
which it makes sense, arrived at some results.  Pragmatism combats 
systematic philosophy in the same manner.  In this combat, it neither 
discusses nor explains itself to the adversary to determine to what extent a 
point of view is right.  Both [pragmatism and existential philosophy] 
separate themselves clearly from the beginning from their adversary, and 
without allowing the least discussion with them.  The comparison between 
the two directions is all the more convincing since neither of them 
underwent the influence of the other.  We will make a comparison between 
these two philosophies, so that in treating one, we will tackle the other; this 
will allow us to show the difference that appears in their overall structure, 
between these ways of philosophizing, by taking as the common 
denominator the progression of the ideas of each towards the notion of 
truth.  Let us say it one more time: pragmatism and existential philosophy 
look to regain a connection to reality. Pragmatism resorts to practical 
experience that it contrasts with the outrageousness of the traditional 
conception of truth; existential philosophy, in its desire for intellectual 
honesty, makes its appeal to the earnestness of the individual.  We will thus 
try to specify the domain of pragmatism and of existential philosophy.  This 
domain is revealed by a specific spiritual attitude in each case.  This spiritual 
attitude is either bound to certain requirements that pragmatism posits as 
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being equivalent to the truth, or, in connection to existential philosophy, to 
the specific inquiry of the “real”5 truth that it proposes. 
II 
Criticism is however too easy a task for pragmatism.  One must try hard 
to penetrate the great intentions of James and Dewey to recognize the 
nearness of pragmatism to the works of the young Nietzsche, for example, 
who speaks in his second “Untimely Meditation” of the “lazy in the garden 
of knowledge.” 
 Dewey denounces the “prejudice that wants that what is6 exists only 
as being known by the mind in some manner,” as if the structure of what is4 
could consist only in the concept.  Our primordial connection with things is 
not, for Dewey, knowledge.  It is rather transaction [commerce] with things 
that is first given.  One has them and experiences them, for example, in 
manipulating them, in wanting them, and in objecting to them as objects.  
They show themselves to me through their resistance.  I notice the weather 
outside as it exerts an influence on my mood.  We have experience of things 
solely through their continuity with practice.  I do not need knowledge 
about a number written as a decimal; I must solely “know” of it, have at my 
disposal a know-how on the subject, possess the manner to write it, etc., in 
order to know how to count with it. But, knowledge in the proper sense of 
the word would signify that one retains something insofar as one 
understands or imagines it.  Here a “lasting” possession was considered 
true.  At first we act in connection with things, and we are right or not 
insofar as we know of them; error is a mistake.  The way that I experience a 
thing is reflected in the manner and direction of my transaction with it.  
What is4 does not first have a structure conceived by the mind, as the object 
of knowledge that is always “represented” in whatever manner.  Does not 
the word “comprehend” indicate the direction of “prehending,” taking in 
hand, that is to say, understanding a thing to the point of knowing how to 
handle it?  We never experience things in some isolated fashion as “objects,” 
but always in the context of situations.  The closest reality had always been 
subtracted.  But, in this case, what does “knowledge” mean?  One speaks of 
the “object” of knowledge.  The thing to be known appears in the form of an 
encounter; it is thus an object only in a “temporary” way.  Knowledge has an 
“episodic” character (Dewey).  Knowledge always responds to a question: 
one examines, one watches up close, one contemplates intensively.  The 
driving force of this heightened activity is always the difficulty in which one 
finds oneself that is due to the interruption of “knowing”: one no longer 
knows how to handle things.  Knowledge depends upon the reconstruction 
of this.  Knowing is thus always surrounded by a horizon that is not on the 
same plane as knowledge, but that holds the knowing subject, leading one 
farther and guiding secretly.  It is not by chance that one desires to know.  
There is no “pure,” disinterested knowledge.  One expects something from 
it, notably to be able to use things again.  Each thing known relates to a 
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particular natural situation.  Whatever it may be or want, knowledge cannot 
go beyond the situation.  Since knowledge brings us back to transaction with 
things, it has an “instrumental function” (Dewey). 
 It has been a question up to now of the “place” of knowledge.  But 
how does it proceed?  The distance that one takes, the division between 
subject and object, shows that one is thrown back upon oneself.  Behind the 
abstract relations from which the theory of knowledge begins, pragmatism 
recognizes in attitudes, affections, etc., what happens from the “existential” 
point of view, the reality in which these relations are to be shown.  One tries 
to analyze, to probe the object of knowledge.  One looks to uncover the 
guiding clues with the intention of “coming to grips” with things.  And 
what, at first, had been provisionally imagined and represented in that 
direction is then proven, as far as possible, by using it with things.  The truth 
is in the resolution and in the elucidation of situations.  A situation bears the 
mark of truth only if one is conscious of having surmounted the schism and 
of having recovered freedom of action.  Knowledge and truth exist only in 
their subsequent effect, in the circumspection and clarity of practical 
experience, and in our transaction with things.  The truth is in what 
originates and “is born” from intelligent action.  It is not stable, because it is 
transformed by the direction in which the whole situation progresses.  One 
cannot take possession of the truth through accumulating.  The truth is only 
a means and must not be exaggerated by hypostasis into a definitive reality.  
It does not exist “in itself.”  It is only a bill of exchange that asks to be 
withdrawn.  The truth does not consist in any kind of agreement with 
objects, but in the fact that some operations of understanding “correspond” 
to situations. 
 The truth is not in the individual, either.  If the truth remains interior, 
it runs the danger of being lost.  Due to its clarity from all perspectives, the 
truth is discovered in the “field” of action.  In the field of action, one finds 
others again.  My power, as well as my knowledge, is conditioned, that is, 
limited with respect to these others.  One can have the purpose of one thing 
or not; we are only able to understand the truth together.  Knowledge 
demands correction by others.  The truth is thus not absolute either, in the 
sense that its origin depends on the mutual good will of those who 
communicate with each other, adjust their knowledge, and are transformed 
by that.  Franklin said, “the man who recognizes his connection with others 
renounces all truth that reasons by itself.”  Every direct assertion destroys its 
communication, because assertions impede the response of the listener.  The 
communication of truth becomes significant when its mobility and the 
danger it runs, due to the dogmatic obstinacy of the individual, are 
recognized.  Indeed, the social psychology of Franklin contains, as was 
already demonstrated by Baumgarten,7 the seeds of pragmatism.  It is a 
mentality, a way of thinking that secretly guides the style of American life.  
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Implicit in pragmatism is a very distinctive notion of life.  It is addressed to 
the “common sense” of a person, the drive to develop reliable connections 
everywhere and to preserve them.  It is an attitude that opposes itself to the 
exclusive possession of knowledge. 
 The fact that pragmatism contains this conception of life is revealed 
precisely by its sincere and authentic character.8  That is to say, pragmatism 
is not conceived exclusively through reason.  Knowledge and truth are 
described there in their practical scope as a human affair.  The way to 
understand and to interpret oneself, in a certain sense, and the motifs of its 
particular conception of the world and of life, are analyzed in an explicit 
fashion in pragmatism.  It speaks to a person of a distinctive character, 
naturally and historically conditioned.  Pragmatism is a supplement that 
philosophy gives to life.  That is how—it is what one first notes—
pragmatism differs so radically from systematic philosophy going back to 
Descartes. 
 It is through the image of the totality of being that these systems of 
philosophy want to address what truly is.9 This fact reinforces a distance 
from oneself.  Even in their struggles and mutual criticisms, these 
philosophies remained joined to one another.  It was above all the position 
of Descartes that always won.  Certainly, human being also was always 
understood, in some manner, in its essence and in the drives of its existence.  
But this anthropological foundation was never recognized and only guided 
secretly the systematic philosophers.  One thus began with a person who 
was not defined by the very structure of human nature, but who was 
considered as a simple given in formulas.  For example, in regard to one’s 
actions, such as knowledge, [the person was presumed] as a condition for 
the realization of it [knowledge].  But this “subject” of knowledge marks an 
inhuman position: the person is artificially constructed as a timeless being, 
as an Archimedean point where human being, in real isolation, would also 
have come off its hinges and been suspended in the air.  The person is 
considered a rational being, who is in fact only the representative of that 
rationality.  The person is cut from the fundamental origins of one’s own 
being.  The general point of view forgets the individual character of a 
person; the real existence of the individual is sacrificed to the timeless idea.  
Since Descartes, philosophy continues in the same manner as science.  It 
shares the anonymity of the latter.  It is representable by means of general 
ideas.10  Its problems, we say, are beyond time.  We examine the correctness 
of its insights and of its knowledge.  In relation to these philosophic systems, 
pragmatism brings an adjustment.  It detects, for example, the secret motives 
and implications of science in its inquiry into the objectivity of knowledge 
and of truth.  It is precisely here that it succeeds in discovering without 
difficulty the sign of the finite; only the being, who is always in some 
situation, can have the desire to free oneself from the particular character of 
these situations and can seek the means to make them available and usable 
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everywhere, always and by everyone.  The truth only becomes objective as a 
“means,” inspired by “foresight” and placed at our disposal. 
III 
Pragmatism gets to the bottom of what really occurs in knowledge.  It 
indicates the place that truth occupies in life and provides a correction to the 
traditional doctrine in the sense that it destroys its illusions.  It wants to 
return to full reality.  But existential philosophy does not want to be solely a 
critical attitude aiming to show the illusory character of an ideology.  It is 
not content with a reflection that would correct and restore, like 
pragmatism, understanding and intelligibility—certainly a basis of general 
agreement not to be denied.  The intellectual honesty of existential 
philosophy is more than a simple “honesty.”  Corresponding to the sincere 
and authentic11 question of pragmatism, there is in existential philosophy an 
effort to remain in the domain of reality itself and true.12  Existential 
philosophy does not want to clarify.  It is precisely clarification that becomes 
irrelevant when this philosophy combats the “evaporation”13 that takes 
place in knowledge and know-how, insofar as those equate to an escape 
from the reality found in ourselves.  A real return is opposed to reflection 
based on a precipitous interpretation.  Existential philosophy shows the 
grave danger that a person dominated by science runs, and who, blinded 
against oneself, is deprived of one’s ownmost possibilities.  It does not adjust 
the facts, but calls to myself, places me,14 in escaping my dislocation,15 seeing 
that I am not able to find my self in the place where philosophy was looking 
for it as a subject of knowledge. Kierkegaard wants to unintoxicate the 
individual; he wants to call the individual back to the reality of temporal 
existence to which one responds, the individual who had been lost in a 
general idea, such as reason or the “objective spirit.”  Nietzsche also desires 
a realism of human existence.  It is not the ideals or conceptions of life that 
count for him, but penetrating unto the very depths of our conscious 
existence—the place of what touches me essentially and what, ordinarily, 
remains hidden under the surface. 
Existential philosophy calls only to the individual and can neither be 
demonstrated and objectively analyzed, nor publicly exhibited.  One calls for 
an interior effort, to which one completely devotes oneself in order to obtain, 
thanks to the “care” of oneself, a new basis. 
This philosophy proceeds step by step.  As a result of the crisis that 
springs from it, existential philosophy is opposed to philosophy since 
Descartes that always strived to find the right “method.”  Method is an 
objective way that one can teach and learn, this is to say, it is a manner of 
“taking objects in hand,” of handling them, of practical advancement, and of 
obtaining safe results.  In contrast, that [Cartesian] philosophy, because it 
presumed to look for the right method, because it wanted to establish itself 
as supreme science, that philosophy escaped, by the force of things, to itself.  
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It renounced its own problems by characterizing them as the new special 
disciplines.  Theory of knowledge, logistical doctrine, diverse schools of 
psychology owe their origin to the consequences of Descartes’ position.  This 
philosophy set aside the reality of my existence, this existence that spans 
from birth to death.  It had been sacrificed to the abstract ideas growing 
outside of time, and, so to speak, halted, deprived of its tension and of its 
indefinite and fragmentary character. 
 The title of Heidegger’s book is Being and Time.16 It poses anew the 
question of knowing what “being” is.  One always understood in some 
vague manner when one was speaking of it, but it is put in an explicit way 
that one must place this average understanding at the disposal of everyone, 
by explicitly placing it within the horizon of the being of humankind.  
Existence understands itself in the diverse significations that it gives to what 
is.17  One can pose the question in two different ways: 
 1. How is it precisely that the constitution of my 
existence is learned from the diverse significations of what 
is?15   
 2. How does the temporal condition of human 
existence inform the intrinsic possibility of our connection 
with the world, that is, from the point of view from which 
the world is presented to us?   
We will briefly exhibit the second question. If one asks what is the 
temporal condition of our existence, we cannot put this existence in 
correspondence with time as we know it in its objective signification as 
present, future, etc.  Because the signification of these, that is, the objective 
signification of a thing as being in the present for us, etc., is only the 
reflection of the temporal character of our existence.  In existence time is 
“constituted,” whereas things are only spread out “in” time constituted by 
that [existence]. 
In what sense is existence, in itself, temporal?  We mean by existence the 
fundamental formal character of the human condition beyond the 
particularities of its anthropological and psychological kind.  We “find” 
ourselves in existence, that is, it is impossible for us to get "behind" or 
"ahead" of ourselves in our existence for which we are answerable and with 
which we can only have relations.  We are not masters of our existence, and 
thus not masters of ourselves, since we do not have command of our 
beginning.  We have Being-in,18 that is, our existence is not a gift that one 
gives to us, but a task that is imposed on us.  It goes thus, through each step 
of our existence, for ourselves.  To exist means power, to have a possibility 
for existing that, because it was handed down to me, finds itself within the 
horizon of possibilities.  Here is the experience that results from it: our life 
demands to be “directed.”  One throws oneself in a certain direction and 
understands, from this point of view, oneself.  Each step of my existence 
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means thus an interpretation of my being, insofar as it is an act of my 
articulation within the world, in some situation.  And yet, the fact that I am 
not master of myself, since I cannot lay the grounds of my being, but am 
only able to take them up in the world, the fact that I exist always “already” 
and thus have overgrown the possibility of my existence, is disclosive of 
existence in its factual nature.  It is the fact par excellence.  That is, it 
[existence] is not a fact, as is generally understood, as what was created in 
time somewhere and then left behind its origin in time.  It is how a hook 
became a hook from another thing.  Previously, it did not exist yet.  There 
was in its place a bit of iron.  The fact that this hook exists afterwards in a 
certain location, in a certain time, shows that it became the prey of the 
context of the events, that it is conditioned by the situations that surround it.  
It has a “place” in time, that is to say, in the reality extended in time.  But the 
factual nature of existence that consists in the temporal character of existence 
is completely different.  Likewise, one cannot separate the event of finding 
oneself from the one of existence.  To exist expresses itself directly in the fact 
of finding oneself.  The temporal condition cannot be separated from 
existence. 
As one must be, one throws oneself into some possibilities and one is 
ahead, or rather beyond oneself.  But as it is about me, on the other hand, in 
the existence for which I am responsible, I move forward at each step of my 
existence, moving towards myself, or rather I come back to myself.  And, 
one more time, I do not comport myself to some future, as one reckons in 
general with the future.  It is not time that remains indefinite; it is me who is 
the indefinite.  I discover myself as an unresolved question.  But this 
responsibility of self, because one moves towards oneself, as being charged 
with one’s existence, happens at the moment of decision.  Existence becomes 
temporal19 in being fulfilled step by step.  It is temporal in an intrinsic 
manner, radically finite, because it is bound to itself by the fact that it moves 
towards itself.  The temporal condition itself “makes” one be oneself.  But 
the temporal condition of things means precisely the contrary of one such 
union with oneself.  What they [things] are, they are through others, and 
time, for them, is a thing that leads them, carries them, and then abandons 
them.   
If each step of existence means a responsibility taken upon itself, 
notably as λóγον διδóναι, knowledge as understanding, that is, 
understanding of [(listening to)] things, is understood in advance.  
Knowledge occurs as an interpretation of oneself in situations.  Existence 
realizes itself in concepts, in the sense that each conception is a realization20 
of itself. 
In knowledge, there is something.  Knowledge does not have an end in 
itself.  Pragmatism, likewise, did not accept that knowledge sets itself up as 
an advocate of a transcendent truth.  Truth consisted however in an 
agreement with things, in an action that corresponded to the situation.  But 
H a n s  L i p p s  |  1 1 5  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XVIII, No 1 (2008-2010)  |  jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2010.174 
πραγµα is an affair of everyone.  One responds as an advocate of situations, 
which means that it is a question of rendering comprehensible and of 
explicating in what sense some thing is “correct” in given situations and in a 
given truth.  One never forgets that a point of view, as correct as it is in the 
moment, can always be surpassed in the course of time.  Explication within 
the world, in existential philosophy, is not a resolution of situations that 
would be, for it, fields of action.  It is a question of being responsible for 
[(answering to)] oneself21 and then my interpretation has no end.  Nietzsche 
says: existence is susceptible to an infinite interpretation, since it always 
forces itself into a new reality when it opens up, in light of the future, its 
own past.  This is so because my past reveals itself to be my destiny that is 
never at the end of its path, but which one must always finish, and because 
one is a being undergoing development and always on the way towards 
oneself.  One’s connection with oneself can develop in two directions: one 
can either surrender or find oneself in one’s own being.  One becomes lost in 
what is not one’s own being, if one moves away from oneself, in the 
forgetfulnes of oneself, through the pursuit of science without having 
understood the sense of one’s activity.  This is how Nietzsche saw the 
learnéd.   To become true means to clarify existence.  Honesty consists in 
seizing oneself in one’s origins, “answering for oneself 18” in what one is 
truly.  A situation is not an objective situation, that is, it is not a place on a 
field where one appears, where one finds oneself with others, where one 
meets them in their intentions, where I am unburdened of all care, where 
one can know for the other, where the truth is a thing in which everyone is 
interested.  The situation that was handed down to me, in my destiny, 
cannot be “resolute” in that manner.  No one can unburden me of anything, 
because I am the only one who is able to do something about it.  Certainly, 
existential philosophy also emphasizes the considerable role that others play 
in the interpretation of life.  It is precisely through others that I am able to be 
brought to myself, before myself, if others call to me to save me from that 
descent where I was sliding, to bring me back to the disclosure of myself.  
One is brought, returned to oneself by the other, and in this case the internal 
tendency of allowing oneself to be called by that other is compulsory. 
The dialectic of Socrates, also, marks one such crisis and transformation.  
When Socrates asks what “is” this or that, he does not want to define 
concepts.  He was talking of a τεχνη µαιεντικη; the interlocutor was to have 
been freed from an unconscious knowing that one was carrying in oneself.  
One was thus to have been brought to the explicit realization of oneself, to 
seize, in the understanding of one’s being, one’s own self.22  It was a 
question for Nietzsche of penetrating into the “original text” of human 
nature, and Kierkegaard spoke of an “original writing” of the relations of 
human existence that he desired to read again.  It is what happens when 
existence, reading its own conceptions, attains some “anticipations,” when it 
takes its basis in the creation of relations that find themselves articulated in 
some notions.  One reaches oneself and one becomes—led step by step—
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conscious of oneself.  The fact of “finding oneself caught,”23 insofar as this is 
the expression of a crisis, reveals the specific philosophic emotion, the 
ϑαυµαζειν of Plato.  Scientific philosophy did not know any emotion.  It was 
a thing in which one was able to “be interested,” but in which the interest 
was not in any way obligatory.  If we previously called pragmatism a 
“supplement,” it was in the sense of a clarification that was made through 
analysis.  But, in existential philosophy, the supplementary24 and “posterior” 
character points to a necessary precedence of what can only guide the 
individual through the fact of being prior, in his explication within the 
world.  This emotion of feeling “caught” is not a simply incidental 
circumstance, but is an integral part of the process of philosophizing that is 
only a return. 
IV 
Is existential philosophy a “reflection on oneself?”  Not in the common 
sense of the word that means that one thinks about oneself, examines one’s 
own situation and connection with the world and humanity.  Such is the 
reflection of Marcus Aurelius and Montaigne.  Ideas, attitudes, and points of 
view are born here.  They mature thanks to the experience acquired in life.  
“Idea” designates a fixed connection with a thing.  One can keep or abandon 
one’s ideas.  They are belief or incredulity.  One “arrives” in some manner at 
skepticism; reservation appears “recommended” or “obligatory,” etc.  The 
insatiable anxiety of existential philosophy is completely different; here the 
anxiety of our existence emerged; here one discovered oneself as an 
unresolved question.  This reflection does not have any ground on which it 
could build its structure.  Does the experimental character of the psychology 
of Kierkegaard, and the character of essay of the aphoristic philosophy of 
Nietzsche, oppose these philosophers to the precise and restricting notions 
of Heidegger, the representative of today’s existential philosophy?   His way 
of developing the structure of human existence, of fixing its framework in 
order to understand in this way the error and destiny of humanity in their 
intrinsic possibility, shows a know-how and a realization in the sense of an 
accomplished work.  Is this a contradiction to what we had said previously, 
that existential philosophy cannot be revealed as a doctrine? 
Let us examine Heidegger’s language.  This language shocks, because 
his expressions are, it seems, meticulous and forced.  But could we point out 
that one is not upset with Aristotle for having created, for example, the 
expression τò τι ην ειναι that is not a word found as such in the language 
then spoken?  One must note as a rule that only one who does not read 
Heidegger as he demands to be read is halted by his language.  He needs to 
be read literally, to the letter, which is not obvious.  One usually reads 
otherwise, e.g., in order to orient oneself and know the ideas of the other.  
One reads without thinking, but above all “between the lines” and the 
words.  One understands what the author means; the author and reader 
meet on the level of an average understanding.  Most things remain only 
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half-said, and have no importance.  The extent of philosophic expositions is 
fixed in large part by the traditions and the schools.  “Subject,” “object,” 
“transcendental,” etc.—it is at the level of everyone.  But the fact that one 
must take Heidegger to the letter signifies the contrary of such a manner of 
reading.  Not that one has to cling to the words, as if a description of 
material exactitude accounts for taking it literally.  But one must hold on to 
each word in its signification as a word.  It is quite another thing than the 
object of designation for which the word is usually employed.  Heidegger 
calls for the search for the lost power of the word.  It is about rediscovering 
the direction in which the word itself gives something to be understood, as 
one such indication of the word, no longer being objectively fixed, secretly 
guides us in the choice of a word, that is, in the struggle that one leads to 
give an adequate form to one’s thought.  Certainly, it is a very special final 
realization that words such as “care”25 and “finding oneself”26 receive.  It is 
discovered only in the pursuit of a movement of thought, for which one can 
only appeal for the onset.  The field of objective relations, which would 
already exist during and for the articulations from which language was first 
formed, is not implicated in this.  The character, of unusual, forced, and 
shocking appearance, of the structures, phrases, and composed words 
protect us precisely from sliding into realizations as facile and common as 
that. The restrictive power of the concepts of “existential”27 analysis are 
completely different from the exactitude of systematic notions.  Because 
“exact” signifies “executed,” and each systematic notion can easily be 
executed, that is, realized by definition.  Through expressions such as “care” 
and “finding oneself,” one is forcibly pushed back into the articulation of 
what one had already understood in the basis of existence. 
 The precise notions of Heidegger then come closer tothe “existential” 
analysis of the philosophy of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard.  This is not a 
philosophy accessible to a person who “only thinks,” for whom only things 
that can be raised to the transparency of reason have value—the only ones 
that person deigns to find suitable.  “Existential” analysis is addressed to the 
individual who must bring something of oneself—who can be led solely 
towards something contained within oneself.  Nothing is able to be 
expressed so directly.  “It is an honor to understand me and that must be 
earned” (Nietzsche).  Nietzsche and Kierkegaard searched for their reader.  
Heidegger also searches for a reader.  What is the honesty of Nietzsche if not 
the enemy of an easy contentment that believes it possesses the truth by 
manipulating formulas and refusing to question itself? 
                                                                  
 
1 This essay was originally published as Hans Lipps, “Pragmatisme et philosophie de l’existence,” 
Recherches philosophiques 5 (1936-1937): 333-345. Rights to the translation are established 
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under the definition of public domain in French law. The translator would like to thank 
Professors Véronique Maisier and Randall Auxier of Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 
and Director Larry Hickman of the Center for Dewey Studies at Carbondale for their support 
and assistance. Translation of Heideggerian terms in English has been correlated to: Martin 
Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (San Francisco: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 1962). German terms and citations in endnotes are the author’s and not 
the translator’s. 
2 In Formen des Allgemeinen. 
3  Existentieller Einsatz. 
4 Jaspers draws attention to the astonishing resemblance between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, 
in their manner of thought, in the "reality of their thoughtful existence," in "their manner of 
understanding" (Vernunft und Existenz, Groningen, 1935). 
5
  Eigenlich. 
6  Das Seiende. 
7  E. Baumgarten, Benjamin Franklin und die Psychologie des amerikanischen (Alltags, Neue 
Jahrbücher, 1933), 251 ff. 
8 Das Echte. 
9 Das Seiende. 
10 Mit Mitteln des Allgemeinen. 
11 Dem Echten pragmatischen Fragens. 
12 Sich in Eigentlichkeit hallen. 
13 Verflüchtigung. 
14 Stelli mich. 
15 Aus meiner Verstellung. 
16 Sein und Zeit. 
17 Das Seiende. 
18 Translator’s note: “à être” is written as “Being-in” (In-Sein) per John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson’s translation of Being and Time, although In-Sein is written être-à by Rudolf Boehm 
and Alphonse de Waelhens in their French translation by Gallimard. 
19 Zeitigt sich. 
20 Aus-zeichnug. 
21 Sich zu stellen. 
22 It was characteristic, to the contrary, for the stance of a Franklin that made a method of the 
irony of Socrates, in wanting to lure, through an apparent lack of confidence, the 
interlocutor towards the arena, in order to give thus the possibility for the thing to emerge 
from manifold sides. 
23 Betroflewwerden.  
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24 Nachtvaglichkeit. 
25 Sorge. 
26 Befindlichkeit. 
27 Existentiale Analytik. 
